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The paper looks for co-evolutionary policy responses to carbon lock-in –  a 
persistent state that creates systemic market and policy barriers to carbon
low  technological  alternatives.  We  address the  coordination role fo r 
authorities rather than the corrective optimisation and analyse experiences 
from  environmental  voluntary  agreements  and  foresight  activities.  The 
paper argues that combining the virtues of these tools into a new pol icy
tool, named Prospective Voluntary Agreement (PVA), can help facilitate an 
escape  from carbon lock-in and provide policy   resources for addressing 
lock-in  related  issues.  The  merit  of  PVA lie s  with the   enhancement  of
collaborative  policy  culture  and  inter-sectoral  and  interdisciplinary 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In  recent  years,  environmental  authorities  have  recognized  the  limitations  of 
conventional command-and-control based instru ments and ex pert driven technocratic 
planning practices and they have develop more flexible and participatory approaches 
(European Commission, 2004; OECD, 2003). Based on the use of market incentives and 
voluntary measures, authorities have introduced alternative methods such as eco-tax es, 
voluntary agreements, negotiated licenses and eco-labelling. These methods pledge to 
reduce the need for intervention on the part of authorities and to bring about change in a 
more cost-effective way. Discussion on the policy rationales of alternative methods has 
largely  focused  on c omparing  them  with c onventional  legislative-type  instruments 
within the optimisation of present production s ystems in terms of environmental and 
economic impacts (OECD, 2000, 2003). Here,  we go with the work o f a number of 
authors (e.g. Ayres, 1991; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1994; Kline, 2001;  Smith, 2000), 
who admit that it is unlikely that optimisation-oriented policy approaches alone are able 
to bring about sufficient change, in particular in  relation to the challenge of curbin g 
climate change. We provide alternative viewpoints by building upon ev olutionary and 
institutional theories that consider technolog ical advance as knowled ge accumulation 
and emphasise learning within innovation processes (Dosi et al., 1988). Thereat, th e 
study is also p art of increasing efforts to create linkages between environmental and 
innovation policy (e.g. European Commission, 2004).  
 
This work contributes to the literature b y elaborating the notion of Techno-Institutional 
Complex  (TIC)  (Unruh  2000;  2002), a conc ept  which builds upon rec ent  efforts  at 
rejoining evolutionary and institutional economics (e.g. Hodgson, 2002; Nelson, 2002). 
More specifically, the p aper argues that industrial economies have been  locked into 
fossil fuel-based energy systems. This condition is termed carbon lock-in, a persistent 
state  that  creates  systemic  market  and polic y  barriers  to  carbon  low  technological 
alternatives. Instead of policy attempts to optimise eco-efficiency of present production 
systems,  our focus l ies  with  the  inducement  of  path-dependent  structural  changes 
(Carrillo, 2004; Llerena and Matt, 1999; Mulder &  Van den Bergh, 2001). The role 
assigned to authorities is not c orrective but coordinative, and is more concern ed with 
influencing  the p rocess  than imposing a p articular  result  (Metcalfe,  1995). Th e 
emphasis is on learning and coordination in the  combined use of regulatory, economic 
and voluntary policy tools. Among alternative methods of environmental policy, we 
focus  on  environmental  voluntary  agreement  (EVA),  defined  as  “an agreement to 
facilitate action with a desirable environmental outcome, which is encouraged by 
government, to be undertaken by the participant based on the participant’s self-
interest” (Storey et al., 1997). In particular, we examine and elaborate EVA practices 
designed  to acc elerate  radical  technological  changes.  EVA  are  typically  negotiated 
between  industry  and  government  as  alternatives  to environment al  regulation  in an  
effort to generate faster environmental results and greater economic efficiency, but also 
criticized as lacking inclusiveness and having poorly defined targets, resulting in lower 
environmental standards, unenforceability and ineffectual monitoring (Makuch, 2003). 
Makuch suggests that an enhanced dialo gue process between authorities and industry 
can help identify potential obstacles before an agreement is created. 
 
Stakeholder  dialogue  process  is inher ent  in the field of innovation   policy  and 
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assessment  and  foresight  activities. W hile  technology  assessment  (Hay  &  Noonan, 
2004)  recognises  the p otential  impacts of ex isting  technological  choices,  foresight 
emphasises learning and vision-building for creating the desirable and even radically 
different future. Foresight is typically employed to enhance long-term sectoral, regional 
or  national innovation a ctivities  (Salo, Könnölä &   Hjelt, 2004).   Recently,  foresight 
activities  have  paid  increasing  attention  to  effective  communication  and e xtensive 
stakeholder  participation.  The High  Level  Expert  Group appointed b y  the Europea n 
Commission  crystallised  these  trends  by  defining  foresight  as  follows  (European 
Commission,  2002):  “A systematic, participatory, future intelligence gathering and 
medium-to-long-term vision-building process aimed at present-day decisions and 
mobilising joint action”. At  its best, foresig ht  process cr eates  common  vision for 
systemic change towards sustainable development. However, difficulties often arise in 
transferring vision into action.  
 
Integrating the virtues o f EVA and for esight provides opportunities to o vercome their 
individual shortcomings. EVA are designed to curb negative impacts of technology and 
polluting  industrial act ivities,  whereas fo resight  activities focus tra ditionally  on 
technological  advance  improving  long-term ec onomic  competitiveness. Combining  
these distinct view points, authorities can use the threat of environmental regulatory 
actions  as  well  as  innovation oriented  economic  incentives to  connect  even 
confrontational stakeholders into a mutually beneficial learning and action towards an 
escape from carbon-lock-in. Thus, the paper argues that combining the virtues of EVA 
and foresight methods into a new policy tool, named Prospective Voluntary Agreement 
(PVA), can help facilitate an escape from carbon lock-in and provide policy resources 
for addressing lock-in related issues. 
 
The  remainder  of this paper is structured as f ollows.  In  Chapter 2,  we  discuss the 
dynamics of carbon lock-in and, in Chapter 3,  elaborate corresponding co-evolutionary 
policy objectives. In Chapters 4 and 5, experiences from EVAs and foresight activities 
are examined and, in C hapter 6, integrated in a new policy tool, named Prospective 
Voluntary Agreement (PVA). Finally, in Chapter 7, the paper discusses implications of 
the proposed tool on environmental and innovation policy-making. 
 
2  CARBON LOCK-IN  
Most of the explanations for failures of the diffusion of environmental technologies tend 
to focus on barriers to adoption within  micro-economic decision-making (Jaffe, Newell 
& Stavins, 2000;  Lohani & Azimi, 1992) giving limited attention to institutional and 
macro-level context. However, institutional theorists make clear that macro-level norms 
and  rules constrain mic ro-level  decision  making  (North,  1981). To un derstand  this 
broader  context,  we  consider  both evolutio nary  and institutional economics. 
Evolutionary  economics
1 focus  largely  on  the  role  of t echnological  advance  in the 
                                                 
1  Evolutionary  approaches  depart  from  the  (aggregate)  production  function  used  by  neoclassical 
economists (Dosi et al., 1988). Given that uncertainty is intrinsic to the process of technological change, 
the neoclassical assumption of rational maximizing behaviour is replaced by a search for profit “in the 
dark” (heuristic search routines); as a result, there is no single welfare maximizing equilibrium, but rather 
a  plurality  of  possible  equilibria:  evolution  of  historical  events  thus  determine  which  equilibrium  is 
reached  or  approached  at an y  given  time;  the  structure,  including  the  economic,  social  and  political 
institutions, is often made explicit in evolutionary approaches (Carrillo, 2004). IE Working Paper                                    EC8-105-I                              02-09-2004 
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economic  development,  whereas  institutional economics  emphasises  institutional 
context in which technological decision are taken. Scholars within both disciplines have 
seen benefits in integrating evolutionary and institutional theory-building (e.g. Hodgson, 
2002; Nelson, 2002).  
 
In the domain of climate chan ge policy, Unruh (2000, 2002) links  evolutionary and 
institutional economics in an interdisciplinary framework termed a Techno-Institutional 
Complex (TIC), which is used to explain the failed diffusion of carbon low technologies. 
Thus,  Carbon lock-in  is a persi stent  state  that  creates  systemic  market  and pol icy 
barriers  to carbon low technolog ical  alternatives  and occurs throu gh  combined 
interactions  among  technological  systems  and  governing  institutions.  Such  lock-in 
arises through path dependent co-evolution driven by increasing returns to scale, which 
Arthur  (1989, 1990,   1994)  has  classified  as  scale  economies,  learning  economies, 
adaptive economies and network economies. Increasing returns mean that the e arlier 
superiority and emergence of dominant design (Nelson, 1995) is no  guarantee of long-
term suitability (David, 1989; Cowan, 1990; Nelson, 1994). Apparently inferior designs 
can become locked in to the production system through a historically dependent process 
in  which circumstantial events in the techno-in stitutional  context  can d etermine  the 
winning alternative (David, 1985, 1997).  
 
A techno-institutional complex is a highly co-evolved, self-referential system where the 
members  of t he  system  create  rules  and pr actices  to  guarantee  its  self-perpetuation. 
Importantly government ministries and regulatory agencies are part of the TIC and are 
active  participants  in  its pe rpetuation.  Governments  become  involved  in the  
establishment  and ex tension  of technolog ical  systems  like road ways  and  electricity 
grids for a variety of reasons including universal service, national security, public safety, 
etc. Co-evolution among the private owners of technology and regulatory institutions 
creates a stable system that aims to provide needed services to society. However, as is 
frequently  the  case,  negative  externalities  associated  with  a  given  technology  are 
belatedly discovered after the system is well established. This is currently the case for 
many energy, transportation, industrial and also a gricultural technologies and the basis 
of  many  current  environmental  challenges.  Over  coming  these  problems  requires 
changes to the underlying technological systems. Such change, however, is impeded by 
techno-institutional lock-in. 
 
The limits of technological change lie generally not with science and technology, which 
tend  to e volve  much  faster  than  governing  institutions, but wi th  the  organisational, 
social  and  institutional  changes  that  facilitate  or  inhibit the   diffusion  of  new 
technological solutions (Unruh, 2000). Within different classifications, we identify two 
generic  types  of t echnological  change:  continuity changes,  which  are i ncremental, 
sustaining changes or additions to  components that preserve the overall  technological 
architecture,  or  discontinuity changes  which  seek  the  replacement  of  the  existing 
systems (Dosi et al., 1988). Historically, environmentally related change has been of the 
continuity  type,  such as   end-of-pipe te chnologies  that leave the produ ction  system 
basically intact and add pollution control equipment onto the end of the process. These 
types of changes account for 70 to 90% of environmental technology expenditures (OIG, 
2000). However, it is b ecoming increasingly clear that some environmental problems 
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cannot be effectively solved through continuity approaches. Dealing with global climate 
change, for example, will require nearly 90% reductions in carbon dioxide emissions by 
industrialized countries, something that currently appears to be be yond the scope o f 
continuity approaches in the energy sector.  
 
Given this internally generated stability, breaking the lock-in situation often requires 
exogenous  pressures  originating  outside of the techno-institutional complex   such as  
major crises or external shocks (March & Olsen, 1989; Hughes, 1987). Some examples 
of  exogenous  pressures  include t echnological  breakthroughs,  social m ovements  or 
environmental disruptions (Unruh, 2002). However, waiting for exogenous forces to 
initiate change can be an inefficient way to resolve environmental problems created by 
techno-institutional lock-in. In fact, our foresight abilities tell us that  many of these 
problems are irreversible, such as massive species extinction or a dramatic abrupt shift 
in  global  climate,  and  that  precautionary  actions  are  needed  to  prevent  them.  The 
challenge  lies in g enerating  forces  for discontinuous change in the T IC.  Escaping 
carbon lock-in in the absence of exogenous shocks requires mutual understanding about 
future problems and some level of consensus among TIC members about technological 
alternatives. It is argued here that generating these mutual understandings on actions can 
be facilitated through PVA. 
 
3  CO-EVOLUTIONARY POLICY OBJECTIVES   
In policy approaches addressing techno-institutional co-evolution, the main question is 
not optimisation and equilibrium, but endogenous path-dependent change and long-term 
co-evolution of environ mental, social and e conomic processes  and complex systems 
characterised by irreversibility and uncertainty (Carrillo, 2004; Llerena and Matt, 1999: 
4, Mulder & Van den Bergh, 2001). The locus of attention moves from the neoclassical 
market failure (Arrow, 1962) towards the improvement in competitive performance and 
the  promotion of struct ural  change  (Mowery  and  Rosenberg,  1989).  Thus,  the role 
assigned  to  authorities  is not c orrective  but  coordinative  (Metcalfe,  1995); thus,  
authorities are more concerned with facilitating processes towards technological and 
structural changes than imposing a particular result. This evolutionary policy approach 
is  especially  important  within  a techno-institutional complex   (TIC),  where  existing 
government policy is partially responsible for inertia to technological change. In this 
case an emphasis on mutual learning and coordination in the combined use of regulatory, 
economic and voluntary policy tools can help to escape lock -in. Additionally, actors 
from outside the TIC are important in providing new alternatives and motivations and 
thus play a role in PVA: The ultimate  goal is a shift a way from public and private 
policies that reinforce the lock-in conditions, to mutually defined policies that foster an 
escape from lock-in. Thus, we elaborate three fundamental objectives that can facilitate 
an escape from lock-in, including the creation of i) radical technological options, ii) 
vision for the implementation of technological alternatives, and iii) changes in both the 
physical and social networks themselves. 
 
3.1 Radical Technological Options 
Escaping lock-in requires as a starting point a variety of radical technological options 
that meet and shape market needs in ways that correct identified negative externalities. 
These options are both physical technologies in the form of te chnological artefacts and IE Working Paper                                   EC8-105-I                             02-09-2004 
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infrastructures, and social technologies (Nelson & Sampat, 2001) in particular, search 
for  their  creative  combination  in a s ystemic  innovation  process  (e.d.  integration  of 
technology push and market pull approaches). In addition to ongoing research efforts in 
environmental  technologies,  cross-disciplinary  and cross-sector al  collaboration is  
required to expand the variety of options both in supply and demand.  
 
Given  bounded  rationality  and  imperfect  information  it is impossible to identif y  in 
advance what technologies and organisational responses are most desirable for society 
(Kline,  2001). Te chnological  development sho uld  be understood as  a  process of  
evolution  in which  alternative  technologies  compete  with on e  another  and  with the 
dominant technology, resulting in selection of winners and losers, with considerable  
uncertainty at the outset about their social merits (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Thus, in 
order  to both pr event  and  escape  lock-in  conditions,  authorities need t o  encourage 
stakeholder  actions to ex pand  the variet y  of  options and respective technolog ical 
trajectories,  and alon g  these  processes  engage  in learnin g  about th eir  social  merits 
(Carrillo, 2004; Kemp, 1997; Metcalfe, 1994). 
 
3.2 Vision for Implementation 
Techno-institutional co-evolution is complex, irreversible, and unce rtain. The impacts 
of technology on environment and society are multi-faceted and may be noticed much 
later than in the  emergence of technology, e.g. detrimental impacts of CFCs on the 
ozone  layer.  Thus, Unr uh  (2002) calls for atte ntion  of polic y  makers  to take into  
account  and c reate  a flex ible  policy  regime  that allows continuous evolution. By  
initiating processes fo r creating the fo resight and systemic understanding of techno-
institutional co-evolution we can begin to formulate pathways to carbon low technology 
arrangements.  Vision b uilding  entails  the  creation  of  future  oriented  scenarios  that 
envision  the ne w  technologies,  new  systemic  interconnections  and  new  institutional 
arrangements.  This  vision  can t hen  guide  the  physical  and or ganizational  changes 
needed to escape a lock-in condition. 
 
The  co-evolutionary  vision-building  is crucial, especiall y  because  of  fragmented 
sectoral  policy-making  structures  originating,  in  particular, from the  application  of 
positivist social sciences. Typical sectoral policy responses to lock-in  are fragmented 
optimisation efforts with command-and-control and market-based instruments, which 
may lead to inefficient and counterproductive policy actions. This creates uncertainty in 
the market and hampers the creation of discontinuity changes. Instead of short-term co-
optimisation efforts between various policy sectors – which easily escalate to a policy 
debate characterised by fixed positions and claiming value (Raiffa, 198 2) – we posit  
that  emphases  need  to  be  placed  on  creating  value  through  continuous stakeholde r 
learning and common vision-building for discontinuity changes. Here, we turn our focus 
in  innovation polic y  and,  in particular, foresi ght  practices develop ed  for  improving 
understanding  of  entire  innovation s ystems  and  creating  common visi on  for  future 
actions. 
  
3.3 Changes in Physical and Social Networks  
The efficient exploitation of technological options and concepts requires a redefinition 
of  stakeholder  roles  and  institutional  structures,  as  well  as  actual  changes  in the IE Working Paper                                    EC8-105-I                             02-09-2004 
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technological systems of concern. Both policy-makers and other stakehol ders tend to 
shape institutional context through their strategic actions of creating and claiming value 
(Powell & DiMaggio, 1991), for example by building new coalitions. These new social 
networks and agreements, in turn, open up possibilities for lock-in breaking innovations 
spurring typically from new technology-based start-up companies within distinct value  
networks from those o f incumbent industr y.  In line with this appro ach, in the ri gid 
energy sector, companies such as Shell and BP have set up spin-offs and subsidiaries to 
develop renewables and hydrogen technology. This type of responses to carbon lock-in 
can  be s een  as st rategic  actions  to  anticipated  market  changes,  but  also  to  improve 
corporate  image.  Whereas  collaborative  action  can  create  new  physical  and soci al 
networks for disruptive radical innovations, it can also be used for enforcing TIC (Beder, 
1998). Thus, authorities need to initiate future-oriented and facilitated  processes that 
direct  possibly  counter-productive  stakeholder  actions  towards  collaboration, 
persuading industry to engage in learning processes, reassess their value networks and  
commit to desired a ction. Here, experiences on EVA provide insight how to commit 
industry to desired a ction by building on incentives and collaboration, without ruling  
out regulatory actions in case of non-compliance. 
 
We examine EVA and Foresight activities in relation to the above three objectives. Both 
EVA and Foresight are participatory collaborative policy tools, which represent distinct 
viewpoints; EVA are designed to curb negative impacts of technology and polluting 
industrial  activities, whe reas  Foresight  activities  focus traditionall y  on technolo gical 
advance improving economic competitiveness. Here, we consider these distinctions as 
starting points for elaborating PVA by combining EVA and Foresight to overcome their 
individual shortcomings. 
 
4  ENVIRONMENTAL VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS  
Environmental Voluntary Agreements (EVA) are typically designed as alternatives to 
environmental  regulation  in a n  effort  to  generate  faster  environmental  results  and 
greater economic efficiency. Thus, research on EVA tends to focus on environmental  
results and economic  efficiency within a sp ecific institutional context (OECD, 2000). 
Our interests, however, lies particularly in the collaborative mechanism of EVA that can 
be  conducive  for  the  development  of innovat ive  solutions, which authorities and 
companies would have been unlikely to develop alone. OECD (2000 ) has classified 
EVA in three categories, including i) unilateral agreements initiated among industry, ii) 
public  voluntary  programmes  devised  by  regulators  and  iii)  negotiated  agreements 
drafted between regulators and industry. Next, we follow this triadic categorisation and 
outline some of the experiences from each of them in relation to the c o-evolutionary 
policy objectives. 
 
4.1 Unilateral Agreement 
Unilateral agreements are commitments by industry to reduce pollution. Thus, the se 
commitments do not necessitate the evolvement of authorities (OECD, 2000). Typically 
unilateral agreements emerge as a response to stakeholder pressures to gain legitimacy 
and  to avoid stricte r  regulation,  for  example,  the Responsible Care   Program  in th e 
chemical  industry  (Howard  et  al.,  2000)  and  the  Declaration  on  Global  Warming 
Prevention  adopted in  1996  by  German  industry  and  trade.  The  former  represents IE Working Paper                                    EC8-105-I                           02-09-2004 
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intensive collaboration in a specific sector facing growing stakeholder pressures, where 
as the latter a loose coalition among different sectors to avoid the implementation of an 
energy  tax.   Thus, unila teral  agreements  tend  to induc e  incremental  and susta ining 
advances  in ph ysical  and  social networks  and  disregard  the  creation  of radic al 
technological options and vision for their implementation.  
 
4.2 Public Voluntary Programme 
Public voluntary programmes are devised by authorities, who establish the frame for the 
programmes and define basic requirements for participation. These programmes usually 
provide technical assistance and positive public recognition to participating companies 
(OECD,  2000). Most of EVA in U.S. are pu blic  voluntary  programmes,  as these  
programmes do not necessitate sectoral industr y coalitions or ag reement negotiations 
with authorities. For example, through Design for Environment Program (DfE), U.S. 
Environment  Protection Ag ency  (EPA) dev eloped  and provided co mpanies  with 
information  how to incorporate environm ental  issues into the desig n  of products, 
processes  and  management  systems  (Delmas  &  Terlaak,  2001a).  The  programme 
emphasised  information  dissemination and coo rdination  of r esearch  and  technology 
development  (RTD) e fforts.  This industr y-research  collaboration  may  create  radical 
technological options and changes in social networks among participants, but does not 
enforce their application, as it does not contain environmental tar gets or sanctions. For 
example, in the case of EPA’s Climate Wise Programme, most corporate level targets 
do  not require radical t echnological  change,  but  can be achieved throu gh  improved 
housekeeping  (Delmas  &  Terlaak,  2001b).  Furthermore,  as pub lic  voluntary 
programmes tend to be designed by authorities  with limited stakeholder interaction, 
visions for implementation of technological alternatives remain fragmented.  
 
4.3 Negotiated Agreement 
Negotiated  agreements  differ  from  unilateral  agreements  and  public  voluntary 
programmes, because they require negotiation between industry and authorities (OECD, 
2000). The success of negotiated agreements to prompt changes in physical and social 
networks relies largely on credible regulatory commitment, which may be diminished 
by the fragmentation of decision-making power among different authorities and the 
open  access  of stakeh olders  in neg otiations  (Delmas  &  Terlaak,  2001b).  When 
stakeholders are included, transaction costs may become excessive. For example, in U.S. 
EPA’s  Project X L  (excellence  and  Leadership),  stakeholder involve ment  entailed 
lengthy and costly negotiations (Blackman & Mazurek, 2000). Thus, wider stakeholder 
engagement  is t ypically  seen as a burd en  rather  than a le arning  opportunity.  Still, 
stakeholder  participation  and transparen cy  of  negotiations  remain i mportant  for 
achieving  legitimacy  and e fficient  implementation  of  an  agreement  (European 
Commission, 1996). 
 
Negotiated agreements may promote radical technological options and changes in social 
networks. For example, the French End-of-Life-Vehicle Agreement spurred from too 
complex problem to be  handled by a single company or industry. Collaboration was 
needed  to cr eate  coordination  mechanism, whi ch  promotes lea rning  and  exploratory 
action. Furthermore, the targets of the agreement asked for changes in technological 
trajectories and learning and mutual knowledge formation between companies. (Delmas IE Working Paper                                   EC8-105-I                             02-09-2004 
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&  Terlaak,  2001a.).  However,  in ne gotiated  agreements  limited attention is paid to  
stakeholder  learning  and  vision-building  for  implementation of t echnological 
alternatives. 
 
5  FORESIGHT ACTIVITIES 
In recent years, national, regional and sectoral foresight studies have been conducted in 
many countries, in order to define rese arch priorities, look at the future from a broad  
range  of  complementary  viewpoints  and  create  common  vision f or  RTD  activities 
(Gavigan, 2002; Hjelt et al., 2001). The locus of foresight activities has tended to shift 
from positivist and rationalist technolog y-focused approaches towards the recognition 
of  broader  concerns  that  encompass the  entire  innovation s ystem,  including  the 
challenge of sustainable development (Gavigan, 2002; Schomberg, 2002). Along this 
development,  increasing  attention has been pai d  to communication and stakeholder  
engagement, which is inherent in the definition of foresi ght given in the introduction of 
the paper. Salmenkaita and Salo (2004) categorise foresight activities in three traits, 
including i) emergent foresight driven by stakeholder interests to align RTD activities, 
ii)  embedded  foresight  conducted  within instru ments  of innovation po licy  and  iii) 
explicit  foresight  initiated  by  policy-makers  to  align  innovation  policy  actions. 
Subsequently,  we discu ss  these practices in re lation  to the co-evoluti onary  policy 
objectives.   
 
5.1 Emergent Foresight 
Salmenkaita and Salo (2004) define emergent foresight as collective and competitive 
processes through which future-oriented analyses are iteratively produced, revised and 
evaluated, in response to a recognized need to align interdependent RTD agendas with 
opportunities  that are p erceived  and sh aped  by  stakeholders who   share  overlapping 
interests.  Emergent  foresights  emerge  typically  within  industry  clusters  with no 
necessary involvement of authorities. F or example, the work of the W ireless World 
Research Forum (WWRF) –  which sought to promote the conception, development and 
diffusion of wireless communication technologies – evolved from the establishment of a 
think-thank  into a foru m  consisting  of open calls for proposals, open meeting s  and 
workshops. 
 
In this kind of networking  process participants synthesise through iterative discussions 
their competing and complementary views into increasingly comprehensive visions of 
the  future  that  may  accelerate  changes  in  physical  and soci al  networks  and t he 
development  of ev en  radical  technological  options  for shaping   future  markets 
(Salmenkaita  and S alo,  2004).  Because  emergent  foresight  is often ini tiated  around 
existing  industry  coalitions,  claiming value   and  power  plays  are  typical  features,  in 
which institutional changes for implementation of radical technological alternatives may 
receive limited attention.  
 
5.2 Embedded Foresight 
Embedded  foresight  refers  to individual and   collaborative  processes  through  which 
prospective  information  about relevant techn ological,  commercial  and  societal 
developments is acquired, produced, refined or communicated within RTD programmes, IE Working Paper                                    EC8-105-I                             02-09-2004 
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in order to generate shared vision for RTD activities (Salo and Salmenkaita, 2002). For 
example, foresight activities embedded in Finnish RTD programmes in electronics and 
telecommunication have been considered highly relevant, especially because the sectors 
are  characterised  by  rapid  technological  advance  (Salo  and Salmen kaita,  2002). 
Foresight activities embedded in steering group meetings and project reviews induce 
changes in social networks among the funding agencies, the recipients of RTD funding 
and  the  consulted  experts  and, t hus,  also  accelerate  the  development  of new  
technological options. However,  embedded foresight often is limited to  the areas of 
existing RTD activities in terms of a time horizon and vision-building and, thus also in 
terms of the scope of changes in physical and social networks. 
 
5.3 Explicit Foresight  
Explicit foresight exercises in support of innovation policy-making exhibit considerable 
variety  within the used   methods. Salmenkaita  and  Salo (2004) consid er  explicitly 
managed foresight projects where (i) the setting of research priorities is among the key 
agenda items, (ii) the work is intensively systematic and analytic, and (iii) participants 
are consulted mainly due to their expertise in specific fields. Often, such exercises are 
run by appointing parallel expert panels, for example The UK T echnology Foresight 
Programme 1994-1995 depended on 15 sector pa nels (Keenan, 2003). Even though the 
process  itself  may  not  ensure  that  steps  towards  the  implementation  of 
recommendations are taken, the results can be used to justify changes in S&T priorities, 
which in turn may create changes in physical and social networks and influence on the 
development  of radi cal  technological  options. F or  example,  the UK   Technology 
Foresight lead to the launch of several new  LINK (academic-industrial collaborative 
RTD) programmes, e.g. waste minimisation through recycling, reuse and recovery in 
industry (Georghiou, Loveridge & Street, 1998). 
 
In explicit foresight, sustainable development is gener ally viewed as a key future need 
to which science and te chnology should be directed. However, explicit foresights tend 
to emphasise opportunities and to neglect threats related to technological advance (Hjelt 
et  al., 2001 ),  thus disre garding  the  viewpoint i nherent  in  environmental  technology 
assessment  (Hay  &  Noonan,  2004). As  a  promising  exception,  an ex plicit  foresight 
initiated by the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning (Borub, 2003) discussed 
future technologies
2 as opportunities for systemic changes but also as pote ntial sources 
for  new  environmental  problems.  In  explicit  foresight,  especially  the  selection of 
participants plays an important role in order to induce creative discussion and challenge 
the existing TIC.  
 
6  PROSPECTIVE VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT  
Interestingly,  the  identified  three  categories  both  in EVA a nd  foresight  activities 
correspond in terms of the level of authorities’ eng agement. Unilateral agreement and 
emergent foresight are both industry lead activities in which  authorities have limited 
access  and  possibilities  to a ssure  desired  actions.  Public  voluntary  programme  and 
                                                 
2 Examples  of  the  identified  technological  systems  included:  Advanced  separation;  Cultivation  of 
biological raw materials; Coal gasification; New generation of photovoltaics cells; Hydrogen for driving 
vehicles;  Intermodal  goods  transport;  Domestic  communication  systems;  Novel  protein  foods; 
Optimisation of horticulture behind glass; Industrial waste as building material. IE Working Paper                                    EC8-105-I                             02-09-2004 
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embedded foresight are  designed and initiated by  authorities but with limita tions in 
terms of time and scope. In negotiated agreement and explicit foresight, authorities, in 
turn, have a major role in the design and management of the process together with 
stakeholders. Thus, these triadic categorisations own a promise for integrating EVA and 
respective  foresight  activities.  As the   co-evolutionary  policy  approach  calls  for 
authorities to actively engage in the coordination of stakeholder processes, we focus on 
combining negotiated agreement and explicit foresight. Despite the wide variety of both 
negotiated agreements and explicit foresights, we typify their archetypes and identify 
their virtues and shortco mings. Archetypal negotiated agreement is characterised with 
following dimensions: 
 
•  Collaboration:  The  parties  engage  in neg otiations  in or der  to ac hieve  better 
outcomes than through competition or coercive actions. For the efficient and 
manageable negotiations, issues are defined and limited in number at the o ut-set 
of the process. As negotiated agreement focuses on environmental prot ection 
and costs, it often disregards other policy areas, thus limiting also the scope of 
decision-making.  
•  Stakeholder engagement: Negotiations tend to be limited between industr y and 
authorities for the sake of efficient and manageable process. This approach is 
based on the experiences that extensive stakeholder participation increases threat 
of  leakage  of  competitive  and prop rietary  information  and pow er  struggle 
through media actions, thus also transaction costs and free- riding (Blackman & 
Mazurek, 2000; Weber & Khademian, 1997). However, ensuring some level of 
stakeholder engagement is considered important, in particular for the legitimacy 
and implementation of an agreement (European Commission, 1996). 
•  Process management: The negotiation is supported by mediation, which helps 
the  parties to work   out their own mutuall y  agreeable  targets  (Raiffa,  1982). 
However, constrained by current institutional pressures negotiations are prone to 
become a political debate of claiming value or suffer from regulatory capture, 
thus contributing to the self-perpetuation of the TIC.  
•  Outcomes: Negotiations lead to an agreement and the commitment of parties to 
the implementation of the agreement. The objective is to create commitment to 
efficient environmental improvements, but difficulties often arise with  poorly 
defined  targets,  resulting  in lowe r  environmental  standards  and  free-riding 
(Makuch, 2003). 
 
There also is a huge variety of explicit foresights, thus the identification of the typical 
characteristics  is  intricate.  For t he  purpose of t his  paper, we t ypify  the  virtues  and 
shortcomings of archetypal explicit foresight as follows: 
 
•  Collaboration: Through a stakeholder learning process, the objective is to create 
supporting  knowledge  for  decision-making,  in  particular,  for  the s etting  of 
research priorities and look at the future from a broad range of complementary 
viewpoints.  However, the opportunities of technolog ical  advance  tend  to  be 
emphasised, whereas threats  underestimated (Hjelt et al., 2001). 
•  Stakeholder engagement: Participants – especiall y from industry, research and 
public  sector but also from civil societ y  – a re  engaged  in order to a cquire 
expertise  in  specific  fields.  Extensive  stakeholder  participation,  for ex ample 
through panels working, becomes challenging as various stakeholders bring  in IE Working Paper                                    EC8-105-I                              02-09-2004 
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the process too many issues to be resolved and unclear interests (Hjelt et al., 
2001; Salo, Könnölä & Hjelt, 2004). 
•  Process management:  Facilitated  future-oriented  learning  process  helps 
participants  to e xplore,  identify,  define  and  stay  focused  on wor king  toward 
foresight objectives. Because the analytic and systemic work is meant to create 
support for decision-making on policy and stakeholder actions, explicit foresight 
is  a l earning  rather  than  decision-making  process.  This  reduces  the  need  for 
lobbying  and claimin g  value and helps partici pants  even with contra dictory 
history to work together (Raiffa, 1982).   
•  Outcomes: The explicit foresight process creates codified information such as 
recommendations for research priorities, but also accumulated tacit know ledge 
and common vision for future action amon g participating stakeholders. It often 
is,  however,  difficult  to de liver  into ac tion  consensus  driven  abstractions  of 
identified solutions. The implementation of foresight recommendations may also 
suffer  from  lack  of  commitment  and pol icy  measures  available  for d ecision-
makers (Salmenkaita and Salo, 2004).  
 
Based on these typified archetypes of negotiated agreement and explicit foresight we 
consider combining their virtues to provide opportunities to overcome their individual 
shortcomings.  Thus, we   propose the development of a new integ rated  policy  tool, 
Prospective Voluntary Agreement  (PVA).  Based  on the d efinitions  on EVA and  
Foresight in Chapter 1, we crystallise the definition for PVA as follows: 
 
a systematic, participatory, future intelligence gathering and medium-to-long-
term vision-building process aimed at creating  an agreement between 
authorities and industry to facilitate desired action. 
 
Recognising the challenge of integrating two different straits of practice, here, we limit 
our elaborations on the  management of stakeholder learning process that supports the 
drafting  a PVA, thus,  giving  limited  attention  to  post-negotiation  activities  such  as 
monitoring. In Table 1, we summarise the main determinants of archetypal negotiated 
agreement  and ex plicit  foresight  and t heir  respective  combined  determinants  for 
archetypal PVA. PVA builds on extensive stakeholder learning process creating ground 
for the negotiation of an agreement between k ey stakeholders. Correspondingly, the 
activities of project coordinators evolve from facilitation to mediation. Instead of fixing 
issues at the out-s et of the process, divergence and convergence of views on future 
challenges are looked for and elaborated throu gh cycles of learning and negotiation. 
During this vision-building process key issues are identified for drafting an agreement 
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Commitment to action   Vision and commitment 
to action  
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Table 1  Determinants for archetypal negotiated agreement, explicit foresight and 
prospective voluntary agreement (PVA).  
 
6.1 Cycles of learning and Negotiation  
PVA process builds on  stakeholder learning and facilitation methods use d in explicit 
foresight  in o rder  to av oid  the pr emature  definition  of issues t ypical  to ne gotiated 
agreements.  In  negotiated  agreement,  the  focus oft en  lies  with  incremental 
improvements  and optimisation of the economic and environmental p erformance  of 
present production systems leading to claiming value characterised by fixed positions 
(Raiffa,  1982). To avoid such lock-in conditio ns,  it  is  pertinent to   begin  with the 
comprehensive mapping of diverse view-points on current and future ch allenges, and 
only after creative formulation of various alternative technological pathways the process 
is  directed  toward  the  identification  of  key  issues  and  focused  negotiations  for  an 
agreement between key stakeholders. The design of creative learning and negotiation 
process  calls  for  authorities  to  take  an  active  role  by  bringing  in the   process  their 
bargaining power and by providing needed infrastructure for conducting such a process. 
This asks for combined use of foresi ght and negotiation methods to bala nce analytic 
(i.e.,  production of   factual  future-oriented  statements)  and  communicative  (i.e., 
facilitation and mediation of dialogue processes among the stakeholders) approaches 
(Salo,  Könnölä &   Hjelt, 2004). Yet, the selection of these approach es  and ensuing 
methodological  choices  is  not an eas y  task,  given  that the diffe rent  methods  (e.g., 
Delphi-survey, critical technologies, expert panels, see, e.g. Porter et al. , 1991) have 
their specific advantages and disadvantages.  
 
Thus, in the man agement of the PVA  process, coordinators need to pay attention to 
responsiveness – by which Salo, Könnölä and Hjelt (2004) define as purposely designed 
managerial controls for making warranted mid-course adaptations to objectives and 
implementation plans.  In  effect,  responsiveness  requires  receptivity  vis-à-vis  the 
interests and expectations of participating stakeholders, and flexibility in planning and 
implementation (Salo, Könnölä & Hjelt, 2004 ). In this setting, the defining feature of 
the responsive PVA process is that k ey stakeholders collaborate with the stakeholders 
from different societal sectors and scientific disciplines, in order to implement process  
cycles of learning and decision-making which, by design, contribute to the formulation 
of radical technological options, vision for their implementation and changes in both the 
physical and social networks themselves.  
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6.2 Structured Stakeholder Engagement  
A shift away from public and private policies that reinforce the lock-in conditions to 
mutually defined policies that foster an escape from lock-in calls for wide stakeholder 
participation engaging actors also from outside the TIC to bring in new alternatives and 
motivations and external monitoring (Timmer, 1997). However, experiences both from 
negotiated agreement and explicit foresight address that wide stakeholde r engagement 
may become too complex and controversial to mana ge (Blackman & Mazurek, 2000; 
Hjelt  et al.,   2001; W eber  &  Khademian,  1997).  Therefore,  responsive  stakeholder 
engagement  arrangements  need t o  balance  between  extensiveness  (e.g.,  which 
stakeholders  are  placed  into  contact  with  each ot her  in  the  different  phases of t he 
process,  in one wa y  or  another?)  and  intensiveness  (e.g.,  how inte nsely  are  these 
contacts  enacted  in te rms  of inform ation  exchanges  and  common vi sion-building) 
(Barré, 2002; Salo, Könnölä & Hjelt, 2004). Based on the experiences from structured 
stakeholder engagement in a foresight study for the Finnish food and drink industries 
(Salo, Könnölä & Hjelt, 2004), we elabor ate three levels of stakeholder e ngagement in 
PVA process with respective objectives: 
 
•  Low engagement:  Stakeholders  exchange  ideas  and p erceptions  on  future 
challenges in seminars and individual interviews and comment on deliverables, 
thus contributing inputs to the process which, however, does not necessarily lead 
to notable changes in their value networks. 
 
•  Medium engagement: Stakeholders participate also in workshops and me etings 
engaging  in  collaborative  learning  processes  and  proactive  development  of 
radical  technological  options  which also create   shifts in participants’ value  
networks  (this, ho wever,  do not   necessarily  lead  to p articipation  in  the  
agreement). 
 
•  High engagement: Key stakeholders are intensively involved in the collaborative 
management of the whole process. Through iterative process cycles of learning 
and decision-making key stakeholders create among them a common vision for 
drafting the workable PVA. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the above three levels of intensiveness in relation to extensiveness in 
stakeholder  engagement.  Within  high  engagement,  key  stakeholders  – namel y 
authorities  and industr y  representatives  who d emonstrate  interest in se arching  for  a 
common  ground  for  a  PVA  – desig n  and man age  together the  cyclic  and  iterative 
learning and decision-making process. They invite extensively stakeholders in low and 
medium engagement. This enables the inter-sectoral and –disciplinary participation of 
experts and responds to the need for the inclusion of participants outside the TIC. High 
engagement,  in turn, c reates  trust and commitment among   the ke y  stakeholders 
minimising the transaction costs of the ag reement negotiations and the likelihood for  
free-riding. 
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Figure 1   Three levels of intensiveness in relation to extensiveness in stakeholder  
engagement. 
 
6.3 Facilitation and Mediation  
PVA process begins with creating value through facilitated mutually beneficial learning 
on present and future challenges and common vision-building. Coordinators facilitate 
the iterative process c ycles of mutual learning, which enables receptive and flexible 
process  design  in ord er  to pr epare  key  stakeholders  for  agreement  negotiations. 
Fundamentally,  postponing  the  negotiation  of  a  PVA suppo rts  responsiveness  and 
creativity by separating the creation and the evaluation of alternative technological and 
social options. Creativity for formulating radically new options can be further facilitated 
by  encouraging  participants  to  share  ideas,  interests  and  expectations,  for  example 
through  the p rovision  of small g roup  work,  anonymous  feedback,  ample  time for 
reflection  and informati on  processing,  and the  acknowledgement  of the pluralit y  of 
values  (Higgins,  1994).  In  agreement  negotiations,  the coordinators move from 
facilitation  to me diation  helping  key  stakeholders  to ide ntify  and  compare  decision 
alternatives and work out their own a workable agreement. Combining experience from 
the mediation of negotiated agreements and from the facilitation of foresight activities 
may  enable not only a  creative learning process but also leading to commitment to 
action for an escape from lock-in.  
 
6.4 Vision and Commitment to Action   
Explicit foresight is designed to contribute to the creation of a common v ision among 
stakeholders, but the implementation of visionary recommendations into action is often 
difficult, because of lack of commitment and p olicy measures available for decision-
makers. Negotiated agreement, in turn, owns a promise for creating commitment, but 
lack  of  learning  between  parties  tend  to le ad  to loose   targets.  Thereat,  combining 
explicit foresight and negotiated agreement provides, on the one h and, an open forum 
for  stakeholder  learning  and the   creation  of  systemic  understanding  of  present  and 
future challenges, and on the other hand, a com mon platform for ke y stakeholders to 
search for a common vision through iterative process cycles. The process culminates 
into a drafting of a PVA among key stakeholders committing them to desired action. 
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governance  within  a sp ecific  type  of  cooperative  arrangement.  Thus, t he  agreement 
should  be seen as a confirmation and reinfor cement  of the value of the emerged 
cooperation. 
 
7  DISCUSSION 
In  this  paper,  we elab orated  co-evolutionary  policy  responses  to  carbon  lock-in, 
addressing the coordination role for authorities rather than the corrective optimisation. 
Within  a techno-instit utional  complex  existing  government  policy  is partiall y 
responsible for inertia t o technological change. Thus, escaping carbon lock-in in the 
absence of exogenous shocks requires continuous learning among stakeholders and the 
inclusion  of act ors  also  from  outside  the  TIC.  Thereat,  we i dentified  the  need for 
authorities  to initia te  future-oriented  stakeholder  learning  processes  to  facilitate  an 
escape from techno-institutional lock-in and provide policy resources for addressing 
lock-in related issues. 
We  examined  EVAs  and  Foresight  activities  in or der  to ide ntify  their  individual 
shortcomings and to sketch a new integrated policy tool, PVA, in which authorities can 
use  the th reat  of  environmental  regulatory  actions  as w ell  as innov ation  oriented 
economic  incentives  to connect  even  confrontational  stakeholders int o  a mutuall y 
beneficial creative learning process and commit them to desired future action. The merit 
of PVA process lies with the enhancement of collaborative policy culture and inter-
sectoral and interdisciplinary stakeholder learning. Thus, in the application of PVA in  a 
specific  policy  context, particular  attention should be paid to  the  creation  of a new 
collaborative  arrangement  that  emerges  from  the  existing  institutional  structures  but 
recognises also the key role of actors outside the TIC and the plurality of viewpoints. At 
best, PVA process helps participants to position themselves in relation to TIC, allowing 
them to take informed decisions for the creation of radically new options and changes in 
physical  and  social  networks.  It  also  helps  consolidate  a  shared  vision  for 
implementation  of technolog ical  alternatives  that supports the development of joint  
action plans.  
 
We  consider our   exploratory  work on   combining  the  virtues of   foresight  and  EVA 
providing  a useful, al though  preliminary  tool  for the further de velopment  of 
participatory  policy  practices  designed  to s ynchronise  environmental a nd  innovation 
policy fields (European Commission, 2004). We suggest further development of PVA 
approach within the both fields of negotiated agreement and explicit foresight: within 
the former it calls for the inclusion of a future-oriented stakeholde r learning process 
before fixing the scope and issues for agreement negotiations and within the latter it 
extends the locus from decision support towards decision-making, thus also committing 
key  stakeholders  to  desired  action.  Therefore,  we  call  for t he  creation  of em pirical 
evidence on PVA by initiating such processes and case studies for policy learning and 
further methodological development. We elaborated PVA as a response to carbon lock-
in conditions, but it ma y well provide support also for addressing other environmental 
problems  characterised  with  techno-institutional lock-in such  as  global  agricultural-
based issues such as water use or impacts on the nitrogen cycle. Finally, even though we 
focused on integrating the virtues of explicit foresight and negotiated agreement, we 
consider also combining the virtues of unilateral agreement and emergent foresight as 
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